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INTRODUCTION 
Almost all states levy some form of corporate income tax.1 In 
administering a corporate income tax system, states must make a series of 
policy decisions, including the tax rate and tax base. A more interesting 
problem arises, however, when considering corporations that do business in 
multiple states: how to determine the portion of income attributable to 
business within each state. This policy of apportionment is a crucial 
element of a corporate income tax system. 
Although the federal government has considered involving itself in 
determining how this income is apportioned to the various states, it never 
has. States have very little federal restrictions on their capacity to determine 
for themselves how much interstate corporate income should be subject to 
their corporate income taxes. This leaves the states the crucial task of 
“slicing a taxable pie[.]”2 While there have been efforts to bring uniformity 
to the states’ apportionment schemes, states have recently splintered in their 
approaches. This is driven in large part by the states’ incentive to maximize 
their revenues while shifting tax burdens onto out-of-state corporations. 
The result is a system that is increasingly complex and difficult for 
corporations to navigate. It is a system that often subjects interstate 
corporations to overlapping taxation. Moreover, it is a system that 
increasingly pushes its tax burdens onto corporations that have very little 
ability to achieve political recourse. It is time for Congress to step in once 
                                                 
 1. 50 State Statutory Surveys: Taxation: Corporate Income Tax, Nature and Basis of 
Tax, 0140 SURVEYS 9 (WestLaw, Oct. 2015). Only Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, 
Washington, and Wyoming have no corporate income tax. 
 2. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 186 (1995). 
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and for all to fix this broken system and institute a simple, uniform formula 
of apportionment that guarantees states cannot reach out and tax those who 
are largely unrepresented in the state assemblies. 
Congress should implement single-factor payroll apportionment 
through legislation that mandates apportionment according to the 
percentage of the business’s payroll expenses paid to residents of that state. 
This formula presents the most straightforward approach to apportioning 
income with the lowest costs of compliance and administration. Applying it 
at the congressional level assures uniformity and negates the states’ 
incentive to craft their own laws to maximize the reach of their tax 
schemes. Further, it focuses the state’s taxing power on the corporations 
that employ individuals within its border—the very businesses that are most 
likely to be represented in the political process that determines the tax rate. 
I. THE HISTORY OF APPORTIONMENT 
The early history of our nation under the Articles of Confederation 
taught the founding fathers a valuable lesson about the importance of 
federal oversight of interstate commerce. Absent a national government 
with the power to restrict state action, states began to impose taxes that 
harmed interstate commerce. In reaction, the framers of the United States 
Constitution expressly banned state taxes on imports and exports. The 
Supreme Court has also applied the Due Process Clause and the Commerce 
Clause of the Constitution to restrict the states’ ability to tax businesses not 
based in their state. 
Nevertheless, these restrictions have not put an end to the states’ 
ability to reach out and tax businesses outside of their state. The courts have 
permitted states taxing jurisdiction over businesses so long as the business 
has even a minimal presence in the state. States also retain considerable 
flexibility to determine what percentage of those out-of-state businesses’ 
revenues is attributable to activity in the state and, therefore, subject to the 
state’s taxes. 
The importance of this flexibility increased with the proliferation of 
state corporate income taxes in the early twentieth century. With limited 
federal oversight, states have developed fragmented approaches to 
apportioning business revenue, a system that increases the complexity and 
costs of engaging in interstate commerce. Worse still, states have found 
ways to use their apportionment formulas to shift their tax burdens from 
businesses within their states to businesses outside of their states. 
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A. The Constitution and Congress place very limited restrictions 
on the states’ ability to decide for themselves how to apportion 
interstate business revenue. 
In 1824, the Supreme Court of the United States stated, “the 
prevailing motive [for adopting the Constitution] was to regulate 
commerce; to rescue it from the embarrassing and destructive 
consequences, resulting from the legislation of so many different States, 
and to place it under the protection of a uniform law.”3 Concern over the 
tendency toward “economic Balkanization” motivated the founding fathers 
to bar the individual states from acting in a manner detrimental to the 
country as a whole:4 
[T]he desire of the commercial States to collect, in any 
form, an indirect revenue from their uncommercial 
neighbors must appear not less impolitic than it is unfair; 
since it would stimulate the injured party by resentment as 
well as interest to resort to less convenient channels for 
their foreign trade. But the mild voice of reason, pleading 
the cause of an enlarged and permanent interest, is but too 
often drowned, before public bodies as well as individuals, 
by the clamors of an impatient avidity for immediate and 
immoderate gain.5 
This concern over “laws that would excite . . . jealousies and 
retaliatory measures” served as the central rationale for the Interstate 
Commerce Clause.6 It also explains the founders’ decision to make taxes on 
imports and exports the only form of tax the states were barred from 
                                                 
 3. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 11 (1824) (noting also that the restrictions under the 
Articles of Confederation had left the states able to regulate commerce for themselves and 
that this had led to “a perpetual jarring and hostility of commercial regulation”); see also 
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979) (“[The Commerce Clause] reflected a 
central concern of the Framers that was an immediate reason for calling the Constitutional 
Convention: the conviction that in order to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the 
tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies 
and later among the States under the Articles of Confederation.”). 
 4. See Wardair Can., Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t. of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1986) (“[S]tate 
regulation that is contrary to the constitutional principle of ensuring that the conduct of 
individual States does not work to the detriment of the Nation as a whole, and thus 
ultimately to all of the States, may be invalid under the unexercised Commerce Clause.”). 
 5. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 264 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 6. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994) 
(“The central rationale for the rule against discrimination is to prohibit state or municipal 
laws whose object is local economic protectionism, laws that would excite those jealousies 
and retaliatory measures the Constitution was designed to prevent.”) (citing THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 22, at 143-45 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961)). 
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administering under the Constitution.7 In fact, concern over the policies of 
some of the states to impose higher taxes on the citizens of other states 
under the Articles of Confederation motivated some of the crucial changes 
included in the Constitution.8 During the debates at the Constitutional 
Conventions, James Madison stated the following in response to concern 
that some states might use taxation to protect their own businesses: “The 
encouragement of Manufacture in that mode requires duties not only on 
imports directly from foreign Countries, but from the other States in the 
Union, which would revive all the mischiefs experienced from the want of a 
Genl. Government over commerce.”9 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has never interpreted the 
Constitution as prohibiting the states from taxing interstate commerce 
entirely. It has held that states may tax a corporation’s net income from 
interstate commerce to the extent that the business was done within the 
state.10 This includes “such portion of the income derived from interstate 
commerce as may be justly attributable to business done within the state by 
a fair method of apportionment[.]”11 The Court has primarily applied two 
clauses to limit a state’s ability to apply corporate income taxes: the Due 
Process Clause and the Commerce Clause.12 
The Due Process Clause13 generally limits a state’s jurisdiction to 
tax people or companies, requiring “some definite link, some minimum 
connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks 
to tax.”14 Further, a state is limited to taxing only that portion of the 
taxpayer’s income or property fairly apportioned to the taxpayer’s activities 
                                                 
 7. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2 (“No State shall, without the Consent of the 
Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports[.]”); see also PAULINE MAIER, 
RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787-1788, at 364 (2010) (“The 
only taxes exclusive to the federal government were on imports; for all others, the states and 
the central government . . . would have ‘concurrent jurisdiction.’”). 
 8. See Tench Coxe to Virginia Commissioners, THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 
(1987), http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_10_2s2.html (referencing the 
fact that several of the states, prior to adoption of the Constitution, imposed higher taxes on 
goods shipped into the state on ships belonging to citizens of other states and lauding the 
state of Pennsylvania for treating the citizens of all states equally for purposes of taxation); 
see also James Madison, Preface to the Debates in the Convention of 1787, THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION (1987), http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_10_2s3.html 
(noting that Rhode Island was the only state not to send delegates to the convention of the 
states because of its concern that the convention would deprive it of the ability to tax its 
neighbors through their consumption of imported supplies). 
 9. Records of the Federal Convention, THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION (1987), 
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_10_2s4.html. 
 10. W. Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 255 (1938). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Lisandra Ortiz, Joyce v. Finnigan: Adoption of the “Best” Approach in Hopes of 
Some Uniformity, 67 TAX LAW. 979, 981-82 (2014). 
 13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]”). 
 14. Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954). 
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in that state.15 With that said, very little is required of the taxpayer to satisfy 
the Due Process requirement of “minimum contacts.”16 In fact, physical 
presence within the state is not required at all.17 Instead, for the state to gain 
taxing jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause, the touchstone is the 
business’s purposeful availment of the state’s market.18 
The Due Process Clause restrictions on the state taxing power are 
supplemented by the Court’s jurisprudence under the Commerce Clause. 19 
In addition to the affirmative grant of power to regulate interstate 
commerce, the Supreme Court has long held that the Commerce Clause also 
places a negative restriction against state action in the same arena.20 Today, 
this doctrine of the “dormant Commerce Clause” is well-established.21 
Originally, the Supreme Court held that any tax burden placed by 
the states on interstate commerce was unconstitutional under the Commerce 
Clause.22 Today, the Court applies a four-pronged test to establish the 
constitutionality of a state tax imposed on an out-of-state corporation 
engaged in interstate commerce: (1) the tax must be applied to an activity 
with a substantial nexus with the taxing State; (2) the tax must be fairly 
apportioned; (3) the tax must not discriminate against interstate commerce; 
and (4) the tax must be fairly related to the services provided by the State.23 
The Supreme Court has established that the substantial nexus 
required for state tax purposes under the Commerce Clause is a more 
significant test than the minimum contact required under the Due Process 
                                                 
 15. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm’r of Taxes of Vt., 445 U.S. 425, 436-37 (1980) 
(“For a State to tax income generated in interstate commerce, the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment imposes two requirements: a ‘minimal connection’ between the 
interstate activities and the taxing State, and a rational relationship between the income 
attributed to the State and the intrastate values of the enterprise.”). 
 16. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 307 (1992) (“[I]f a foreign corporation 
purposefully avails itself of the benefits of an economic market in the forum State, it may 
subject itself to the State’s in personam jurisdiction even if it has no physical presence in the 
State.”). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate 
Commerce . . . among the several States[.]”). 
 20. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 209 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.) (“[A]s the word ‘to 
regulate’ implies in its nature, full power over the thing to be regulated, it excludes, 
necessarily, the action of all others that would perform the same operation on the same 
thing. . . . There is great force in this argument, and the Court is not satisfied that it has been 
refuted.”). 
 21. See Dep’t. of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 337 (2008). 
 22. Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640, 648 (1888) (“[N]o state has the right to 
lay a tax on interstate commerce in any form, whether by way of duties laid on the 
transportation of the subjects of that commerce, or on the receipts derived from that 
transportation, or on the occupation or business of carrying it on, and the reason is that such 
taxation is a burden on that commerce, and amounts to a regulation of it, which belongs 
solely to congress.”). 
 23. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977); see also Nw. 
States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 452 (1959). 
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Clause.24 Traditionally, the Court stuck to a bright-line rule, requiring the 
seller to have some physical presence within the state.25 That physical 
presence requirement, however, can be satisfied with minimal presence 
such as a sales force, plant, or office.26 Nevertheless, the Court has resisted 
efforts to lower this barrier.27 In reaching this decision, however, the Court 
has specifically noted that the extent of the states’ reach in the taxation of 
interstate businesses is an issue that Congress is “better qualified to 
resolve” and that Congress “has the ultimate power to resolve.”28 
The central purpose of the second prong of the test, fair 
apportionment, is “to ensure that each State taxes only its fair share of an 
interstate transaction.”29 Courts, in evaluating this point, look to the internal 
and external consistency of the tax.30 This often overlaps with the third 
prong which bars taxes that discriminate against interstate commerce. Such 
discrimination might occur “either by directly providing a commercial 
advantage to local business . . . or by subjecting interstate commerce to the 
burden of ‘multiple taxation[.]’”31 To determine whether a particular state 
tax subjects taxpayers to multiple taxation, the Supreme Court applies the 
internal consistency test, hypothetically assuming that every state has the 
same tax structure and then asking whether this hypothetical scenario would 
result in multiple taxation.32 With that said, if another state in fact has a 
different method of apportionment, the same income can be apportioned to 
be taxed by either both states or no state at all without running afoul of the 
Constitution.33 As the following discussion demonstrates, however, these 
                                                 
 24. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 313 (1992). 
 25. Id. at 315; see also Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 
753, 758 (1967) (holding that Illinois could not impose a use tax on purchases when the 
seller’s only connection with the state was by mail or common carrier). 
 26. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 315. 
 27. See, e.g., Nat’l Geographic Soc’y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 556 
(1977) (holding that California could impose a use tax on National Geographic’s mail-order 
activities in the state because the company maintained two offices in the state which 
solicited advertising for the magazine). 
 28. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 318. 
 29. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 184 (1995) (quoting 
Golderg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 260-61 (1989)). 
 30. Id. at 175-76 (“Internal consistency looks to whether a tax’s identical application 
by every State would place interstate commerce at a disadvantage as compared with 
intrastate commerce. There is no failure of such consistency in this case, for if every State 
were to impose a tax identical to Oklahoma’s—i.e., a tax on ticket sales within the State for 
travel originating there—no sale would be subject to more than one State’s tax. External 
consistency, on the other hand, looks to the economic justification for the State’s claim upon 
the value taxed, to discover whether the tax reaches beyond the portion of value that is fairly 
attributable to economic activity within the taxing State.”). 
 31. Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959). 
 32. Comptroller of Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1801-02 (2015). 
 33. See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 279 (1978) (“The potential for 
attribution of the same income to more than one State is plain.”). 
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restrictions have done little to constrain the states’ creativity with respect to 
the apportionment of business revenue. 
B. State efforts to unify behind a single approach to apportion 
interstate business revenue have failed absent federal intervention. 
Wisconsin enacted the nation’s first modern state income tax in 
1911.34 As use of corporate income taxes spread, the states’ formulas for 
apportioning the income of multistate corporations were “all over the 
map.”35 The National Tax Association,36 as early as 1922, began to seek a 
uniform rule of apportionment for the states to adopt.37 By the late 1930s, 
the National Tax Association began to support the Massachusetts formula, 
which placed equal weight on payroll, property, and sales.38 The formula 
was a product of “political expediency and ease of adoption” rather than 
economic principal or theory.39 It was a political compromise between the 
manufacturing states, which preferred property and payroll factors, and the 
market states, which preferred the sales factor.40 
In 1933, the National Tax Association adopted a model law that 
included a single business tax on corporate income and the Massachusetts 
formula.41 This proposal, however, was not adopted by the states.42 In 1957, 
the Uniform Law Commission took up the task of crafting a uniform 
method of apportionment.43 Although most states were initially reluctant to 
collaborate on the project, the Uniform Law Commission ultimately 
adopted the Uniform Distribution of Income for Tax Purposes Act 
                                                 
 34. Charles E. McLure, Jr., Understanding Uniformity and Diversity in State 
Corporate Income Taxes, 61 NAT’L TAX J. 141, 142 (2008). 
 35. Id. at 146; see also H.R. REP. No. 88-1480, Vol. 2, 118 (1964) (“[V]ariation 
appears to be its most significant historical characteristic. Not only have there always been 
wide diversities among the various formulas employed by the States, but the composition of 
those formulas seems to be constantly changing.”). 
 36. The National Tax Association is a nonpartisan, nonpolitical educational 
association of tax professionals “dedicated to advancing the theory and practice of public 
finance” founded in 1907. About NTA, NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION (Jan. 3, 2016), 
http://www.ntanet.org/about-nta.html. 
 37. McLure, supra note 34, at 146. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Richard Pomp, Report of the Hearing Officer: Multistate Tax Compact Article IV 
[UDITPA] Proposed Amendments, MULTISTATE TAX COMM’N 1, 11 (Oct. 25, 2013), 
http://www.mtc.gov/uploadedFiles/Multistate_Tax_Commission/Pomp%20final%20final3.p
df.  
 40. Id. 
 41. The Project to Revise UDITPA, MULTISTATE TAX COMM’N 1, 4-5 (2009), 
http://www.mtc.gov/uploadedFiles/Multistate_Tax_Commission/Uniformity/Minutes/The%
20Project%20to%20Revise%20UDITPA.pdf. 
 42. Id. at 5. 
 43. Id. 
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(“UDITPA”).44 Like the National Tax Association’s proposal before it, 
UDITPA applies the Massachusetts formula to apportion business revenue. 
Once again, there was little support among the states.45 At this 
point, Congress got involved, passing the Interstate Income Act of 1959 
(known as Public Law 86-272).46 Title I of Public Law 86-272 bars states 
from asserting income tax jurisdiction over a business whose only contact 
with a state is solicitation of orders for sales of tangible personal property.47 
Public Law 86-272’s application is limited, however, to taxes based on net 
income (as opposed to gross receipts taxes) and only protects businesses, 
not incorporated or otherwise domiciled in the taxing state, that sell tangible 
personal property.48 
Title II of Public Law 86-272 charged the U.S. House Judiciary 
Committee and the Senate Finance Committee to “make full and complete 
studies” of the issue “for the purpose of recommending to the Congress 
proposed legislation providing uniform standards to be observed by the 
States in imposing income taxes on income [derived from interstate 
commerce].”49 This task was charged to the “Special Subcommittee on 
State Taxation of Interstate Commerce,” which was known as the Willis 
Committee for its chairman, Rep. Edwin Willis of Louisiana.50 The Willis 
Commission ultimately recommended federal legislation to establish a 
uniform state apportionment that would be equally weighted but only use 
two factors: property and payroll.51 The proposal was more extensive than 
this, however, also recommending a uniform definition of taxable income 
that would substantially conform with the federal definition. 52 Even further, 
it gave the U.S. Treasury Department authority to issue uniform rules and 
regulations and create a uniform tax return.53 The House of Representatives 
                                                 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. Only three states had adopted UDITPA by 1964: Alaska, Arkansas, and 
Kansas. 
 46. Interstate Income Act of 1959, Public Law 86-272, 73 Stat. 555 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 381-384). 
 47. 15 U.S.C. § 381; see also Giles Sutton et al., The Increasingly Complex 
Apportionment Rules for Service-Based Businesses (Part II): Unique Issues, J. MULTISTATE 
TAX’N AND INCENTIVES 6, 11 (Jan. 2008). 
 48. 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-383; see also Sutton et al., supra note 47. The following 
activities are not protected by the Act: repair and maintenance services, collection activities, 
installation services, technical support services, repossession activities, picking up or 
replacing equipment, recruiting or training personnel, consigning tangible personal property, 
and leasing equipment or facilities within a state. 
 49. Interstate Income Act of 1959, Public Law 86-272, 73 Stat. 555. 
 50. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-1480, at 1-2 (1964); see also McLure, supra note 34, at 149. 
 51. McLure, supra note 34, at 154. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 155. 
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went so far as to adopt an amended version of the Willis Committee 
proposal in 1968, but the Senate failed to act on the issue.54 
The States, fearful of losing sovereignty, took a renewed interest in 
UDITPA.55 Several adopted it through the Multistate Tax Compact, which 
incorporated UDITPA nearly word for word.56 The Compact became 
effective in 1967, creating the Multistate Tax Commission as its 
administrative agency.57 As many as forty-eight states and the District of 
Columbia ultimately joined the Committee, either by adopting the 
Multistate Tax Compact by statute or by joining the Committee as either 
sovereignty or associate members.58 
The U.S. Senate took up the subject of apportionment of interstate 
corporate taxes in 1973. The Senate considered two bills: one modeled after 
earlier legislation in the House that would impose a uniform maximum 
apportionment59 and one authorizing the newly-generated Multistate Tax 
Compact.60 At the time, business interests preferred the former, as indicated 
by the support of the United States Chamber of Commerce, while state 
administrators preferred the latter.61 Ultimately, the Multistate Tax 
Compact won out as a compromise between the two forces.62 
This period represents the pinnacle of uniformity in business 
revenue apportionment among the states, with Iowa the only state to 
substantially forgo the then-standard Massachusetts formula.63 Whatever 
uniformity UDITPA created, however, quickly deteriorated: 
                                                 
 54. First Annual Report, MULTISTATE TAX COMM’N 1 (Jan 28, 1969), 
http://www.mtc.gov/uploadedFiles/Multistate_Tax_Commission/Resources/Archives/Annua
l_Reports/FY67-68.pdf. 
 55. The Project to Revise UDITPA, supra note 41, at 6. The First Annual Report of the 
Multistate Tax Commission stated, “The origin and history of the Multistate Tax Compact 
are intimately related and bound up with the history of the states’ struggle to save their fiscal 
and political independence from encroachments of certain federal legislation introduced in 
congress during the past three years.” First Annual Report, supra note 54, at 1 (citing H.R. 
11798 introduced in 1965, H.R. 16491 introduced in 1966, and H.R. 2158 introduced in 
1967). 
 56. The Project to Revise UDITPA, supra note 41, at 6. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Today, fifteen states (Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Kansas, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, Texas, Utah, and 
Washington) and the District of Columbia remain full members of the compact. Only 
Nevada and Virginia have no formal membership with the Commission. Member States, 
MULTISTATE TAX COMM’N, http://www.mtc.gov/The-Commission/Member-States (last 
visited Jan. 4, 2016). 
 59. Interstate Taxation Act of 1973, S. 1245, 93d Cong. (1973). 
 60. S. 2092, 93d Cong. (1973). 
 61. See State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On 
State Tax’n of Interstate Commerce of the Com. On Finance, 93d Cong. 85 (1973) 
(statement of Leonard E. Kust – Member, Taxation Committee, Chamber of Commerce of 
the United States). 
 62. See id. 
 63. McLure, supra note 34, at 156 (adopting, instead, a sales-only apportionment 
formula). 
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[S]tates are increasingly moving away from two of its 
provisions in particular – equal weighting of the three 
factors, and sales factor sourcing for services and sales of 
intangible property. In addition, a handful of specific 
provisions have proven to be unclear. The lack of clarity 
has made those provisions targets for change or 
clarification by state regulation, legislation, litigation, and 
sometimes all three.64 
States were initially reluctant to break from UDITPA’s 
apportionment formula for fear of running afoul of constitutional 
constraints. The Supreme Court’s 1978 opinion in Moorman Manufacturing 
Co. v. Bair calmed those fears by establishing that states were free to 
formulate independent policies for apportioning corporate income until 
Congress intervened.65 After the Moorman decision, other states have 
followed Iowa’s lead by increasing the weight on the sales factor “to gain a 
competitive advantage[.]”66 The sales factor, as discussed above, had 
originally been introduced as a nod to market states that sought to increase 
the percentage of revenue they could tax among businesses based in the 
manufacturing states but which made extensive sales within the taxing 
state. Today, it has become a tool by which many states extend the reach of 
their taxing authority to out-of-state businesses. 
Some states have been very transparent about their motivation for 
moving towards an increased reliance on the sales factor. The bill analysis 
presented on the California State Assembly floor when it considered 
                                                 
 64. The Project to Revise UDITPA, supra note 41, at 7; see also Charles E. McLure, 
Jr., The Difficulty of Getting Serious About State Corporate Tax Reform, 67 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 327, 329 (2010) (“[D]espite UDITPA’s endorsement of an apportionment formula that 
accords equal weight to the taxpayer’s payroll, property, and sales, there is substantial 
variation in the weights that the states actually apply, with an increasing number giving sales 
double or greater weight–or even sole weight, presumably for economic development 
reasons.”) (citing Michael Mazerov, The “Single Sales Factor” Formula for State Corporate 
Taxes: A Boon to Economic Development or a Costly Giveaway?, CTR. ON BUDGET & 
POLICY PRIORITIES 1, at 15-19 and 21-59 (Sept. 2005), http://www.cbpp.org/3-27-01sfp.pdf). 
 65. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 280 (1978) (“While the freedom of the 
States to formulate independent policy in this area may have to yield to an overriding 
national interest in uniformity, the content of any uniform rules to which they must subscribe 
should be determined only after due consideration is given to the interests of all affected 
States. It is clear that the legislative power granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause of 
the Constitution would amply justify the enactment of legislation requiring all States to 
adhere to uniform rules for the division of income. It is to that body, and not this Court, that 
the Constitution has committed such policy decisions.”). 
 66. McLure, supra note 34, at 156. California, originally a full member of the 
Compact, having adopted its entire text in 1974, adopted a different apportionment formula 
in 1993, double-weighting the sales factor. See Gillette Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., No. 
S206587, 2015 WL 9589602, at *3 (Cal. Dec. 31, 2015) (affirming that the 1993 legislation 
superseded the apportionment formula found within the Compact itself even though 
remaining portions of the Compact remained in effect). 
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legislation to double-weight the sales factor stated that the bill was 
“intended to improve California’s business climate by shifting the corporate 
tax balance against those ‘who simply sell into our huge consumer market 
without putting manufacturing jobs here.’”67 The California Senate 
Revenue and Taxation Committee was even more explicit, saying, “The bill 
would have the effect of reducing the tax for most California-based 
businesses, and increasing the tax on most businesses based in other states 
and on some businesses based in foreign countries.”68 
This is not to say that state legislators are simply predatory and 
eager to get their hands on the wealth of other states. Rather, the climate of 
competition has forced their hands if they wish to ensure their states’ own 
businesses and citizens are given the best opportunity to succeed. In 
California, one member of the Senate Revenue and Taxation Committee 
referred to the decision to double-weight the sales factor as a “bad idea 
whose time has come[,]” noting that “now that many other states have taken 
the plunge, and made self-serving adjustments to their  
formulas, . . . California-based businesses are being harmed by our lack of 
action in conforming with the emerging ‘standard’ of an expanded sales 
factor.”69 
By 1993, at least seventeen states had increased the weight of the 
sales factor to account for at least half of the formula.70 By 2007, thirty-
three states had increased the weight of the sales factor.71 Today, thirty-six 
states plus the District of Columbia place at least that much weight on the 
sales factor.72 Nineteen states plus the District of Columbia have gone so far 
as to use a single sales factor apportionment formula, eliminating the 
property and payroll factors entirely.73 Recognizing the movement toward 
increased reliance on the sales factor, in 2013 the Multistate Tax 
Commission’s Uniformity Committee recommended amendment of the 
Multistate Tax Compact to double-weight the sales factor.74 The Executive 
Committee, however, voted to allow states to determine the weighting of 
the various factors for themselves, merely recommending the double-
weighting of the sales factor as their preferred solution.75 
                                                 
 67. Cal. B. Analysis, S.B. 1176 Assem. (March 5, 1993); see also Giles Sutton et al., 
The Increasingly Complex Apportionment Rules for Service-Based Businesses: Basic Issues, 
J. MULTISTATE TAX’N AND INCENTIVES 24, 26 (Oct. 2007) (“Competitive economic pressures 
to attract high-wage jobs . . . have caused states, from a policy perspective, to reduce the 
apportionment weighting of physical-presence factors such as payroll and property and 
increase the weighting of the market-based sales factor.”). 
 68. Cal. B. Analysis, S.B. 1176 Sen. (Apr. 21, 1993). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Sutton et al., supra note 67, at 27. 
 72. See Appendix A. 
 73. See Appendix A. 
 74. Report of the Hearing Officer, supra note 39, at 8. 
 75. Id. at 9. 
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In addition to expanding the reach of their taxing power, the states 
have increasingly diverged from a uniform approach to apportionment. The 
resulting system is not ideal: 
This, then, is an assessment of the State income tax system 
and its effect on interstate commerce in the United States 
today. It is the picture of a system which works badly for 
both business and the States. It is the picture of a system in 
which the States are reaching farther and farther to impose 
smaller and smaller liabilities on more and more 
companies. It is the picture of a system which calls upon 
tax administrators to enforce the unenforceable, and the 
taxpayer to comply with the uncompliable.76 
Looking forward, there is no indication that the states have either 
the will or the ability to solve the problem of business revenue 
apportionment on their own. 
II. CONGRESS SHOULD INTERVENE 
The history of business revenue apportionment demonstrates the 
inability of the states to come to a reasonable solution absent federal action. 
Indeed, it was the possibility of federal action that encouraged a brief 
period of harmony among the states through the adoption of UDITPA. As 
federal attention faded, however, the states have fallen once again into 
disarray, producing an unworkable business climate. 
The time has come for Congress to intervene. First, fractured 
apportionment policies are the product of a self-destructive interstate 
competition the founding fathers aimed to prevent. Second, this competitive 
environment has compelled the states to adopt policies that violate the 
principle of no taxation without representation. Third, the lack of 
uniformity that results from state autonomy in this arena is harmful to our 
nation’s business environment. For these reasons, this is precisely the kind 
of dispute between the states that Congress was meant to resolve. 
While the states might balk at the idea of federal intrusion on state 
autonomy for purposes of state taxation, federal intervention on the issue of 
apportionment will still leave to the states the ability to determine for 
themselves the proper tax rate to apply and the tax base to which it will be 
applied within the limits of revenue apportioned to the state. The states 
have now been given ample opportunity to come to a solution on the 
question of revenue apportionment and they have failed. For these reasons, 
congressional action on this issue is both desirable and justified. 
                                                 
 76. H.R. REP. No. 88-1480, V. 1, at 598 (1964). 
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A. Fractured apportionment policies are the product of a self-
destructive interstate competition the founding fathers aimed to 
prevent. 
The founding fathers were acutely aware of the dangers that result 
when a majority of voters “are united and actuated by some 
common . . . interest[] adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the 
permanent and aggregate interests of the community.” 77A faction that 
reaches such majority status is dangerous because it is not cured by the 
republican principle that “enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by 
regular vote.”78 Instead, the only natural mechanism for curtailing the 
effects of a majority faction is found through enlarging the republic, thus 
making it more difficult for such a majority to work in concert to achieve 
destructive ends.79 
Majority factions are particularly troublesome when it 
comes to tax policy: 
The apportionment of taxes on the various descriptions of 
property is an act which seems to require the most exact 
impartiality; yet there is, perhaps, no legislative act in 
which greater opportunity and temptation are given to a 
pre-dominant party to trample on the rules of justice. Every 
shilling with which they overburden the inferior number is 
a shilling saved to their own pockets.80 
Where states are permitted to indirectly tax the wealth generated by 
businesses based in other states, an externality problem exists. The voters of 
the state are united in their interest to maximize revenues to fund services 
offered by the state from which they receive substantially all the benefit. 
Where they can do so by increasing revenue from out-of-state sources, the 
out-of-state sources have no means of defeating such proposals in state 
elections and the voters of the state face a much smaller proportion of the 
cost. 
As discussed above, the founders experienced this problem first-
hand in their years under the Articles of Confederation. Today, those same 
“embarrassing and destructive consequences” once found to be the result of 
the freedom of states to regulate interstate commerce for themselves are 
occurring again because Congress has failed to satisfactorily address the 
problem of business revenue apportionment. Congress should intervene 
                                                 
 77. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 72 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 78. Id. at 75. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 74-75. 
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now to stem the tide and rescue the states from this self-destructive mode of 
competition. 
B. This competitive environment has compelled the states to adopt 
policies that violate the principle of no taxation without representation. 
As discussed above, the competition between the states has 
compelled states to extend the reach of their corporate taxes to reach 
businesses based outside of their state. This produces dangerous policy 
results not just for our federal system, but also for the rights of those taxed. 
Every year, students across this country are taught the mantra of many of 
the early participants in the American Revolution: “No Taxation Without 
Representation.” The increasingly widespread reliance on the sales factor 
violates this principle. 
For purposes of business revenue apportionment, it is important to 
understand how businesses—and the people that make them up—are 
represented in state legislatures. Businesses, in the words of Judge Posner, 
are a “legal fiction.”81 For purposes of representation, they are best 
understood as groups of people. Robert Dahl once stated that “[t]he actual 
political effectiveness of a group is a function of its potential for control 
and its potential for unity.”82 This supposition has led to a debate among 
academics as to whether businesses actually unify substantially enough to 
exert influence on the political system that is dangerous to democracy. As 
one political scientist put it, though, this debate misses the point: “Policies 
match the collective desires of business only when citizens, through their 
policy preferences and voting choices, embrace ideas and candidates 
supportive of what business wants. To bolster its odds of winning in 
politics, business needs to seek backing from the broader public.”83 
A business’s interests are represented in a legislature only to the 
extent that those interests overlap with those of the citizens who are 
represented by that legislature. Applying this concept to the question of 
apportionment of business revenue, each factor that is included in the 
Massachusetts formula shifts the burden of taxation onto businesses with 
different degrees of representation in the state legislature. The payroll factor 
shifts the burden onto businesses that employ more people in the state. The 
property factor shifts the burden onto businesses that own more property in 
the state. Because property tends to require people to care for it and often 
serves as the place of employment, the property factor also likely shifts the 
                                                 
 81. Cenco, Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 455 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) 
(pointing out that the beneficiaries of a judgment in favor of a corporation are the people 
behind the business such as stockholders). 
 82. Robert A. Dahl, A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model, 52 THE AM. POL. SCIENCE 
REV. 463, 465 (1958) (emphasis removed). 
 83. MARK A. SMITH, AMERICAN BUSINESS AND POLITICAL POWER: PUBLIC OPINION, 
ELECTIONS, AND DEMOCRACY, 8 (2002). 
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burden onto businesses that employ more people in the state, though with 
less precision than the payroll factor. The sales factor, on the other hand, 
shifts the burden onto businesses with customers in the state. 
If a business’s interests are more likely to overlap with those of its 
employees, representation should be stronger for businesses covered by the 
payroll and property factors. If a business’s interests are more likely to 
overlap with those of its customers, the representation should be stronger 
for businesses covered by the sales factor. For several reasons, it is clear 
that the former, rather than the latter, is true. Employees are more likely to 
hold interests similar to those of the businesses that employ them.84 
Employees are also more likely to hold interests similar to those of their 
coworkers.85 This makes sense because of the strong impact of social 
groupings on the political leanings of an individual.86 We also know that the 
personal financial interests of the voter are important to his vote.87 These 
personal financial interests are most likely to align with the interests of the 
business that employs the voter, considering the extent to which his well-
being depends on the health of the business that supplies his paychecks. 
While customers are likewise interested in reducing the prices of 
the businesses that supply the goods and services they purchase, there is no 
parallel social grouping and a much more diffused connection between the 
interests of the customer and the interests of the seller. A given employee 
has far fewer employers than a given customer has businesses from which 
he purchases. Therefore, it is much less likely to be true that a business is 
represented through the votes of its customers than it would be that it is 
represented through the votes of its employees. 
One potential caveat to this line of reasoning might be found in the 
potential for businesses to exert influence on the legislative process through 
lobbying, bypassing the electoral process entirely. To whatever extent a 
business might be able to influence legislation in this way, the ability to 
engage in lobbying is very limited for out-of-state businesses. Indeed, 
political scientists have determined that “groups often must have some sort 
of presence and support within the legislator’s district” in order to engage in 
the effective use of lobbying tactics.88  This, along with the cost of engaging 
                                                 
 84. See generally Oddbjørn Knutsen, The Impact of Sector Employment on Party 
Choice: A Comparative Study of Eight West European Countries, 44 EUR. J. OF POL. RES. 
593 (2005) (finding that sector employment has an impact on party choice in Denmark, 
Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands). 
 85. See MICHAEL S. LEWIS-BECK, ET AL., THE AMERICAN VOTER REVISITED 70 (2014) 
(finding that a vast majority of American voters indicated in a poll that their work associates 
belong to the party of the candidate for whom the voter had cast his ballot). 
 86. See id. at 305. 
 87. See, e.g., Rebecca Riffkin, Jobs, Government, and Economy Remain Top U.S. 
Problems, GALLUP (May 19, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/169289/jobs-government-
economy-remain-top-problems.aspx (finding that twenty percent of respondents in a Gallup 
poll identified jobs or unemployment as the most important problem facing the country). 
 88. Jennifer Wolak et al., Much of Politics Is Still Local: Multi-State Lobbying in State 
Interest Communities, 27 LEGISLAT. STUD. Q., 527, 529 (2002) (citing ELISABETH R. 
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in lobbying, explains the findings of political scientists who determined that 
most organizations, even among those that do engage in lobbying, do not 
have a lobbying presence in more than one state.89 
For these reasons, businesses are not effectively represented in the 
legislatures of states where their employees do not reside. Therefore, the 
increasing reliance on the sales factor, relative to the payroll or property 
factors, indicates a decreased connection between the business’s 
representation and its tax liability in a state. This fact would have alarmed 
our nation’s founders. 
One of the strongest critiques presented by those opposed to the 
ratification of the Constitution focused on the power that it gave the federal 
government to levy direct taxes on citizens.90 Some argued that this would 
violate the people’s “right to be taxed by representatives who underst[and] 
their circumstances.”91 Indeed, one early critic of the Constitution on these 
grounds stated the following: “The most certain criterion of happiness that 
any people can have, is to be taxed . . . by those representatives who 
intermix with them, and know their circumstances.”92 
The fundamental importance of representation should remain today 
an important consideration in any discussion of tax policy. The fact that 
federal inaction in this area has permitted the states to expand the use of the 
sales factor, increasingly reaching out to tax those not represented in their 
state legislatures, serves as yet another reason for Congress to intervene. 
C. The lack of uniformity that results from state autonomy in this 
arena is harmful to our nation’s business environment. 
The Constitution barred the states from collecting duties on imports 
or exports, in part because of the benefits of uniform national commercial 
legislation.93 Chief among the benefits of uniformity of tax laws among the 
states is that it holds down the costs of compliance for businesses and 
                                                                                                                 
GERBER, THE POPULIST PARADOX, (1999); KEN KOLLMAN, OUTSIDE LOBBYING: PUBLIC 
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POLITICS RES., Vol. 37, No. 2 (2009). 
 89. Wolak et al., supra note 88, at 537 (finding that more than half of all organizations 
registered to lobby were only registered to lobby in a single state and that the mean number 
of states in which an organization was registered to lobby was only 1.635). 
 90. MAIER, supra note 7, at 367. 
 91. Id.; see also id. at 413 (describing the argument of one critic of the proposed 
Constitution in North Carolina who stated that state legislatures were more aware than 
Congress of the people’s ability to pay). 
 92. Id. at 414 (quoting Judge Samuel Spencer from the North Carolina ratifying 
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administration for the states.94 The report of the Willis Committee found 
that the costs related to division of income among the states “w[ere] 
exhibited by more [businesses surveyed] than any other cost group” except 
for filing costs, which are necessarily incurred by all businesses filing 
taxes.95 Interestingly, recordkeeping for preparation of sales factors was the 
most common work associated with this cost.96 Compliance costs, 
understandably, were highest among the largest companies.97 According to 
their study conducted in 1962,98 manufacturers with gross receipts over $1 
million faced costs of up to $5,913 just in complying with the various 
states’ apportionment laws.99 Adjusted for inflation, this would equate to 
costs of $47,696.18 in 2017.100 
That is not to say that only large businesses face the costs of this 
lack of uniformity. Indeed, smaller businesses are often less able to absorb 
even the smaller relative costs that come with compliance in this arena. The 
following is an excerpt from a letter included in the appendix to the 
Hearings of the Subcommittee on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce 
when the Senate took up the issue of business revenue apportionment in 
1978: 
The increase in the burden of keeping records and filing 
forms is becoming tremendous. It falls most heavily on the 
small business, which cannot afford a staff of accountants 
and lawyers to cope with a multiplicity of differing state  
laws. . . . Small as we are, we have to study thoroughly the 
specific requirements and differences that exist between the 
various state tax systems. . . . Thus, the small firm is 
penalized by the present multiplicity of different systems 
and the large firm realizes an “economy of scale” that has 
nothing to do with efficiency or quality of production or 
service to the consumer.101 
                                                 
 94. McLure, supra note 34, at 141; see generally Sanjay Gupta and Lillian F. Mills, 
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With this cost of compliance in mind, it is easy to see why the 
United States Chamber of Commerce supported imposition of a uniform 
standard of apportionment, at least as a cap on the amount of revenue any 
state could apportion to itself, when the Senate considered taking action in 
the 1970s.102 Uniformity would also drastically cut back on the litigation 
that has littered the arena of business revenue apportionment in recent 
years.103 Congress, therefore, should take action to simplify the increasingly 
complex apportionment calculus that interstate businesses must undertake 
and that the states must enforce. 
D. State autonomy will be limited only as to apportionment of 
taxes and is justified because of the states’ failure to come to a 
reasonable solution on their own. 
States understandably feared the loss of autonomy that would come 
with congressional imposition of a standard formula of apportionment when 
Congress took up the proposals of the Willis Committee.104 This fear was 
based at least in part on the Committee’s proposal that Congress impose not 
just a formula but also federal administrative oversight over these taxes.105 
Nevertheless, some have argued that, in light of the multitude of problems 
that have accompanied the modern system, the states would have been 
better off if they had simply taken the suggestion of the Willis 
Committee.106 
This Note suggests nothing more than for Congress to impose a 
uniform apportionment formula on the states, leaving the states entirely free 
to administer their corporate income taxes. To that extent, the proposal is 
less intrusive on state autonomy than the Willis Committee’s. Like prior 
proposals, this one would also leave states free to determine for themselves 
the appropriate tax rate to apply and otherwise determine for themselves the 
appropriate tax base. 
The goal of this proposal is not to achieve uniform tax policy in all 
areas, but rather to limit the scope of variation so as not to allow states to 
engage in battle through apportionment formulas. Uniformity is not 
beneficial if it extends to tax rates because this would eliminate the 
beneficial effects of tax competition.107 The imposition of a single formula 
for apportionment of business revenue forces states to engage openly in this 
                                                 
 102. Id. at 85 (statement of Leonard E. Kust – Member, Taxation Committee, Chamber 
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 103. McLure, supra note 34, at 148; see also John A. Swain, Reforming the State 
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beneficial competition with their tax rates rather than through the back door 
of revenue apportionment. 
Imposition of a standard apportionment formula is an entirely 
reasonable reaction to the history of state action on this issue. States have 
failed to reach a sensible solution to the problem of dividing the revenue of 
interstate businesses. Instead, the states have engaged in a self-destructive 
competition, unnecessarily burdening business. The states failed to reach 
any uniformity prior to Congress stepping in and considering action in the 
1960s and 1970s. The uniformity that came after this was short-lived and 
has completely failed in recent years. Congress has given the states ample 
time to come up with a solution on this issue. Now, it is time for Congress 
to act. 
III. SINGLE-FACTOR PAYROLL APPORTIONMENT 
Of course if Congress should act, it then becomes important to 
discuss how exactly revenue should be apportioned. To answer that 
important question requires consideration of both the policy and practical 
implications of various alternatives. States have relied on three primary 
factors to determine how to apportion a business’s revenue: sales, property, 
and payroll. The Massachusetts formula, adopted from the early years of 
the movement toward uniformity, simply took these factors and weighted 
them equally. However, neither policy nor practice justifies this approach. 
Of these three factors, the payroll factor is the superior method of 
apportionment and should be chosen to the exclusion of the other two. The 
sales factor violates important policy considerations of representation and 
has produced tremendous litigation in its application. While the property 
factor does not produce the policy concerns inherent in the sales factor, its 
application has been similarly complex. The payroll factor alone avoids 
both policy and practical problems in apportioning revenue. 
While each factor was chosen to balance the interests of different 
states that play different roles in our national economy, the states that might 
fear loss of revenue from exclusive reliance on the payroll factor should 
find comfort in two points. First, there is evidence that the actual impact 
this policy will have on state revenue will be minimal. Second, whatever 
short-term impact this will have on state tax revenue for states that tend to 
be on the market end, rather than the production end, of business 
transactions will be made up for in their retaining the ability, in the long-
term, to use tax policy to attract business to employ more of their residents. 
A. The Massachusetts formula is a forced political solution that 
cannot be justified in policy or practice. 
The Massachusetts formula, which simply averages the three 
factors that have been used at various times to apportion business revenue, 
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was never based in policy but was instead a product of politics. It was never 
popular among economists.108 Nobel prize winning economist William 
Vickrey described the formula as a “simple but arbitrary and capricious 
formula [with] all the earmarks of having been concocted by a committee of 
lawyers who had forgotten anything they ever were taught about statistics 
or economics.”109 Perhaps more importantly, the value of the formula is 
limited to the value of each of its constituent elements. As the following 
discussion will illustrate, two of the three constituent elements of the 
formula have serious problems of their own. 
B. The sales factor violates important policy considerations of 
representation and has produced tremendous litigation in its 
application. 
In practice, the sales factor “has been subject to considerable 
controversy and litigation.”110 In fact, the sales factor has “undoubtedly 
generated the most litigation of any of the apportionment factors.”111 First 
of all, determining the location of sales made by service providers, as 
opposed to those who sell tangible personal property, has become an 
increasingly complex question.112 Some states use a method of income-
producing activity sourcing,113 while others use market-based sourcing.114 
To further complicate matters, some states also apply special rules to source 
“personal services,” but they generally do not define that term.115 For 
similar reasons as those that motivate states to increase the weight of the 
sales factor generally, the modern trend among the states is to apply the 
market-based sourcing approach.116 One problem with this approach is that 
it is often difficult for a service provider to determine exactly where its 
customers benefit from its service.117 
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Another problem with applying the sales factor is the Joyce-
Finnigan118 issue: deciding whose sales should be included in the sales 
factor numerator of a group of corporations subject to combined reporting 
when only some of the members of the group have nexus in the taxing 
state.119 States have split as to which approach they have adopted.120 All of 
these problems, and the different solutions the states apply, only exacerbate 
the problem of lack of uniformity among the states. 
In addition to these practical problems, the sales factor is the 
mechanism by which states extend the reach of their taxes to businesses 
outside of their state to tax businesses with little to no representation in 
their legislatures as discussed above in Section II-B. One need only look to 
the express words of state legislators increasing the weight of the sales 
factor to see what it is being used to do: “reduc[e] the tax for most [in-state] 
businesses, and increas[e] the tax on most businesses based in other 
states[.]”121 
Economists have criticized use of the sales factor in particular. In 
fact, William Vickrey stated that the factor should be eliminated from the 
formula altogether due to its volatility and tendency toward being 
determined by trivial circumstances of the sale.122 During the 1960s, when 
Congress was considering imposing a formula for apportioning income 
among the states, the most controversy surrounded use of a sales factor.123 
In the words of the Special Subcommittee on State Taxation, the sales 
factor is “the single element which is the most troublesome part of formula 
apportionment today.”124 Despite these concerns, the framers of UDITPA 
adopted the sales factor as part of the Massachusetts formula to allow the 
states that provide a market for the taxpayer’s products to increase the reach 
of their taxing authority.125 Congress should correct this mistake by 
establishing an apportionment formula that does not include this 
problematic sales factor. 
                                                 
 118. This name refers to two decisions of the California State Board of Equalization 
that reached opposite conclusions on the same issue. See In re Joyce, Inc., No. 66-SBE-070, 
1966 WL 1411 (Cal. St. Bd. Eq. Nov. 23, 1966) (holding that only sales of taxable members 
count), overruled by In re Finnigan Corp., No. 88-SBE-022-A, 1990 WL 15164 (Cal. St. Bd. 
Eq. Jan. 24, 1990) (holding that all sales by members of the group count so long as any 
member of the group has nexus in the taxing state). 
 119. Ortiz, supra note 12, at 979. 
 120. Id. at 997 (noting that fifteen states follow the Joyce rule while ten states follow 
the Finnigan approach); see also Sutton et. al, supra 47, at 9-11. 
 121. Cal. B. Analysis, S.B. 1176 (Apr. 21, 1993). 
 122. William Vickrey, The Corporate Income Tax in the U.S. Tax System, 73 TAX 
NOTES 597, 602 (1996). 
 123. See State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, supra note 61, at 94 (1973) (statement 
of Leonard E. Kust, Member, Taxation Committee, U.S. Chamber of Commerce). 
 124. H.R. REP. NO. 89-952, pt. 6, at 1145 (1965). 
 125. Swain, supra note 103, at 288 (“The property and payroll factors are intended to 
give weight to the states in which production occurs (‘origin’ states), while the sales factor is 
intended to give weight to the states that provide the market for the taxpayer’s products 
(‘market’ states or ‘destination’ states).”). 
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C. While the property factor does not produce the policy concerns 
inherent in the sales factor, its application has been similarly complex. 
Although not as problematic as the sales factor, the property factor 
is very difficult to measure, presents a series of difficult choices in 
determining the proper method of valuation, and often ignores intangible 
assets.126 Under UDITPA, the property factor is based on the original cost 
to the user of assets, with no adjustment for either depreciation or 
inflation.127 Further, intangible assets, which can be the “crown jewels” of a 
modern corporation, are not included in the calculation.128 Solving these 
problems, however, would require further accounting procedures which 
might be more accurate, but more costly to comply with, especially for 
small businesses. Considering the property factor is meant to cover the 
same basic concept as the payroll factor, where the business operates, 
Congress can avoid these issues by simply removing the duplication of the 
property factor. 
D. The payroll factor alone avoids both policy and practical 
problems in apportioning revenue. 
The payroll factor is “relatively straightforward and satisfactory,” 
especially when viewed in light of the other factors presently used to divide 
income.129 Whatever controversy has existed in applying the payroll factor 
has typically involved determining the extent to which payment of 
independent contractors or subcontracted employees should be included in 
its calculation.130 More importantly, the payroll factor furthers the policy 
objective of linking taxation to representation. 
The payroll factor is intrinsically linked to representation because it 
treats the corporation as it is: a group of people. To the extent that 
employees of the business are compensated for their service to the 
corporation, they share the interests of the corporation. These people are the 
ones who benefit from government services. These people are the ones who 
are represented in the state legislatures. Using the payroll factor, a state can 
tax a business’s revenue in proportion with the percentage of its payroll that 
goes to residents of that state. 
The one concern with the use of the payroll factor in practice is the 
impact of outsourcing.131 The problem that outsourcing creates in 
application of the payroll factor is that a business headquartered in one state 
could reduce its tax liability to that state by moving its production facilities 
                                                 
 126. McLure, supra note 34, at 148. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See Sutton et al., supra note 47, at 13-16. 
 131. McLure, supra note 34, at 148. 
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outside of the state and hiring from that location. In applying a uniform 
formula, though, Congress removes this problem where businesses remain 
in the United States because this merely shifts the tax burden to the other 
state. Theoretically, moving facilities outside of the country could still be 
beneficial to the corporation if the foreign country maintains a different 
method of apportionment or a lower tax rate. 
Nevertheless, the strong policy need for a connection between 
representation and taxation should still compel use of the payroll factor, 
even in the case of a business that moves its operations and personnel costs 
outside of the country. Doing so has drastically reduced the corporation’s 
capacity for representation within the state. To the extent that the benefits 
of the wealth generated within the state remains with management in the 
state, the state would retain the ability to tax that portion of the business’s 
revenue. Therefore, the payroll factor is the optimal method of apportioning 
business revenue among the states. 
E. Whatever loss of revenue some states might incur because of 
this policy change will likely be minimal and outweighed by the long-
term consequences of the current trend. 
There is considerable speculation and disagreement involved in 
estimating the potential impact of various apportionment formulas on state 
tax revenue. The Willis Committee concluded, after extensive analysis, that 
the use of a two-factor, property-payroll formula would not appreciably 
affect any state’s tax revenue and that “the great majority of States” would 
see no more than a one percent change in total tax revenues.132 With that 
said, the proposal that the Willis Committee advanced in Congress never 
passed, in part due to complaints from Congressmen that it would cost their 
states millions of dollars in tax revenue.133 
Whether real or not, the belief that the sales factor favors some 
states over others and, therefore, that its elimination would advantage some 
states and harm others, has played a crucial role in its continued use in 
virtually every apportionment formula proposed or implemented in recent 
years. This belief rests largely, however, on a shortsighted view of the use 
of the sales factor’s impact on state economies. This view treats the 
orientation of the state’s economy as a market participant or a producer as a 
static condition rather than dynamically related to the tax policy of the state. 
The states’ reliance on the sales factor rests in part on their 
determination that they could not attract businesses to relocate or otherwise 
                                                 
 132. H.R. REP. NO. 89-952, Vol. 4, pt. 6, at 1150-51 (1965). 
 133. See 114 CONG. REC. 14, 412 (1968) (statement of Rep. Richard Ichord) (claiming 
that the proposed formula could cost Missouri from $25 million to $50 million). But see 114 
CONG. REC. 14, 407-08 (1968) (statement of Rep. Edwin Willis) (citing tax administrators 
from various states admitting that their initial fears of drastic impact on tax revenues were 
incorrect). 
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invest in physical locations within their borders.134 Even if state lawmakers 
are not basing their votes on this concession, it is the practical effect of their 
decision. Eliminating or reducing the property and payroll factors reduces 
the tax impact of locating property and hiring within a state’s borders.135 
For corporations, it means they are less able to flee high-tax jurisdictions.136 
For market states, it means they are unable to attract multistate corporations 
to locate within their borders through their tax policy. The short-term goal 
of increasing revenue from corporations producing in other states is a long-
term loss for the market states that increase their reliance on a sales factor. 
While it might increase their tax base, it negatively impacts their ability to 
attract job-producing businesses to their state that can have a more long-
lasting positive effect on the state’s economy. 
To illustrate this point, see the following example. Company A is 
based in State Y and employs only residents of State Y. Company A makes 
fifty percent of its sales to customers in State Y and the other fifty percent 
of its sales to customers in neighboring State Z. Company A’s total revenue 
is $100,000. Assume that States Y and Z both apply a single-factor sales 
apportionment formula. State Y applies a tax rate of ten percent while State 
Z applies a tax rate of five percent. So long as Company A’s sales remain 
the same, its tax liability to States Y and Z will remain unchanged 
regardless of where it is located. Even if State Z were to decrease its tax 
rate, that might encourage Company A to make more sales into the state, 
but it would not encourage Company A to move its operations to State Z 
and employ more of its residents. 
 
Sales Factor Apportionment Company A’s Tax Liability 
 To State Y To State Z Total 
If located in State Y $5,000 $2,500 $7,500 
If located in State Z $5,000 $2,500 $7,500 
 
Alternatively, assume that States Y and Z both apply a single-factor 
payroll apportionment formula. In this scenario, the tax rates imposed by 
the two states become very important to Company A in deciding whether to 
relocate. 
  
Payroll Factor Apportionment Company A’s Tax Liability 
 To State Y To State Z Total 
If located in State Y $10,000 $0 $10,000 
If located in State Z $0 $5,000 $5,000 
 
                                                 
 134. See Sutton et al., supra note 67, at 26. 
 135. Swain, supra note 103, at 289. 
 136. Id. at 290. 
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Moreover, for corporations, the increased reliance on the sales 
factor has two negative consequences. First, it means that states can no 
longer compete with one another for the corporation’s physical presence 
through their corporate income taxes because the location of the corporation 
has little bearing whatsoever on the corporation’s tax burden to the state. 
Second, the largest corporations within each state, and thus the ones with 
the greatest ability to influence tax policy, are less interested in the tax rates 
in their own state, which reduces the incentive for states to keep tax rates 
lower. Therefore, an apportionment scheme that focuses almost exclusively 
on the location of sales weakens the political mechanism for keeping 
corporate taxes low. As seen in the illustration above, the lowest tax 
liability for the business is where the business has the flexibility to locate in 
the state with the lowest tax rate under a payroll factor apportionment 
scheme. 
On the other hand, an apportionment scheme that focuses 
exclusively on payroll strengthens that political mechanism by placing tax 
revenues in the jurisdiction in which interested parties within the 
corporation have the most ability to influence legislation. Although it might 
negatively impact the short-term tax revenues of market states, it improves 
these states’ ability to seek long-term wins by attracting businesses to 
employ more of their citizens. 
CONCLUSION 
The legacy of our nation’s early experience under British rule and 
the Articles of Confederation includes two lessons which now compel the 
conclusion of this Note: (1) taxing authority must be linked to the 
representation of the taxed entity and (2) the states must not be left to 
compete against one another in interstate commerce in a manner destructive 
to the national economy. Apportionment of interstate business revenue 
presents problems for states on both points. Although the Supreme Court 
and Congress have taken limited steps to curtail the destructive effects of 
state policy in this arena, the states have nevertheless produced a vast array 
of discordant rules that fail to meet these policy objectives and produce a 
multitude of problems in practice. 
The solution presented in this Note is simple: Congress should 
settle the matter once and for all by establishing the formula for slicing the 
pie of interstate business revenue. This solution produces desperately-
needed uniformity for businesses operating in multiple states, minimizing 
the costs of compliance and administration. Further, Congress should 
choose a single-factor payroll formula of apportionment because it indelibly 
links taxing authority with the principles of representation. It also presents 
fewer problems in practice than the alternative factors used to apportion 
business revenue. 
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The present state of apportionment policy in this country presents 
quite the contrast to this simple solution: 
It is the picture of a system which works badly for both 
business and the States. It is the picture of a system in 
which the States are reaching farther and farther to impose 
smaller and smaller liabilities on more and more 
companies. It is the picture of a system which calls upon 
tax administrators to enforce the unenforceable, and the 
taxpayer to comply with the uncompliable.137 
The solution this Note presents, alternatively, would work for businesses 
and the states. It would limit the states to taxing only the income linked to 
businesses represented in their legislatures. It would also minimize the costs 
of compliance and administration. 
The cruel irony of the current trend of the states to increasingly rely 
on the sales factor is that it cements the position of the market states by not 
allowing them to offer incentives for businesses to relocate to their states. 
This Note’s proposal allows the market states, those who have pushed for 
the use of the sales factor from the beginning, to retain the ability to 
incentivize businesses to relocate within their borders through the 
competitive use of tax rates. This is good both for the states and the 
businesses for which they will compete. 
The long history of apportionment among the states has 
demonstrated the inability of the states to come to a reasonable solution 
such as this on their own. While voluntary state action on matters such as 
this would be preferable, federal action to prevent self-destructive 
competition among the states in interstate commerce was authorized by the 
framers of the Constitution to prevent a repeat of the discordant relationship 
between the states that developed under the Articles of Confederation. They 
recognized that a prosperous national economy would require a neutral 
arbiter to step into situations such as this. To fulfill that purpose and rescue 
the states from themselves, now is the time for Congress to act. 
APPENDIX 
State 
Sales Factor 
Weight138 Citation 
Alabama 50% Ala. Code § 40-27-1 
Alaska 33% Alaska Stat. Ann. § 43.19.010 
                                                 
 137. H.R. REP. No. 88-1480, V. 1, 598 (1964). 
 138. It is important to note that many states have special formulas for certain industries. 
Further, some states allow taxpayers the option to elect different formulas in some situations. 
Nevertheless, the numbers above indicate the typical weight placed on the sales factor in the 
apportionment formulas for each state. 
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State 
Weight  of  
Sales Factor Citation
Arizona 50% Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 43-1139 
Arkansas 50% Ark. Admin. Code 006.05.308-26-51-709 
California 100% Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 25128.7 
Colorado 33% Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-60-1301 
Connecticut 100% Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 12-218 
Delaware 50% 5 Del. Admin. Code § 1114 
District of 
Columbia 100% D.C. Code § 47-1810.02 
Florida 50% Fla. Stat. Ann. § 220.15 
Georgia 100% Ga. Code Ann. § 48-7-31 
Hawaii 33% Haw. Rev. Stat. § 235-29 
Idaho 50% Idaho Code Ann. § 63-3027 
Illinois 100% 35 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/304 
Indiana 100% Ind. Code Ann. § 6-3-2-2 
Iowa 100% Iowa Admin. Code r. 701-54.5 
Kansas 33% Kan. Stat. Ann. § 79-3279 
Kentucky 50% Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 141.120 
Louisiana 100% La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 287.95 
Maine 100% Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 36, § 5211 
Maryland 50% Md. Code Ann., Tax-Gen. § 10-402 
Massachusetts 50% Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 1-182, § 38 
Michigan 100% Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 206.115 
Minnesota 100% Minn. Stat. Ann. § 290.191 
Mississippi 33% Miss. Code Ann. § 27-7-24 
Missouri 33% Mo. Ann. Stat. § 32.200 
Montana 33% Mont. Code Ann. § 15-1-601 
Nebraska 100% Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 77-2734.05 
Nevada No Corporate Income Tax 
New Hampshire 50% N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 77-A:3 
New Jersey 100% N.J. Admin. Code § 18:7-8.1 
New Mexico 70% N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-4-10 
New York 100% N.Y. Tax Law § 210-A 
North Carolina 100% N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 105-130.4 (effective Jan. 1, 2018) 
North Dakota 33% N.D. Cent. Code § 57-38.1-09 
Ohio 60% Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5733.05 
Oklahoma 50% Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 68, § 2358 
Oregon 100% Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 314.650 
Pennsylvania 100% 72 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 7401 
Rhode Island 33% R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 44-11-14 
South Carolina 100% S.C. Code Ann. § 12-6-2252 
South Dakota No Corporate Income Tax 
Tennessee 60% Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-4-2012 
Texas No Corporate Income Tax 
Utah 33% Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-311 
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State 
Weight  of  
Sales Factor Citation
Vermont 50% Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, § 5833 
Virginia 50% Va. Code Ann. § 58.1-408 
Washington 100% Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 82.04.460 
West Virginia 50% W. Va. Code Ann. § 11-24-7 
Wisconsin 100% Wis. Stat. Ann. § 71.04 
Wyoming No Corporate Income Tax 
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